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South Korea 
 
1. Country facts 
1.1 Political background 
 
Located in North East Asia, in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and bordering the 
Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, the Republic of Korea belongs to the so-called “Four 
Tigers” (i.e., Hong Kong, China, Singapore and Taiwan, China). Its capital is Seoul. 
 
As a consequence of WW2, the Korean Peninsula was split on August 15, 1945 with the 
northern half dominated by Communists and the southern portion becoming Western 
oriented. The armistice signed after the Korean War (1950-53) split the peninsula along a 
demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel of latitude. 
 
After two military coups and several decades of authoritarian rule, South Korea is now a 
democracy. The constitution of the Sixth Republic1, promulgated in 1987, provides a directly 
elected President, who serves a single five-year term and appoints the Prime Minister and 
the cabinet. There is also a unicameral National Assembly (Parliament), elected at four-year 
intervals. In December 1997, at his fourth attempt, the veteran democrat, KIM Dae-jung, 
narrowly won the presidency. His successor, ROH Moo-hyun was elected on December 20, 
2002 to take office in February 2003. The last parliamentary election was held in April 2000. 
The next one will be held in April 2004. 
 
In its first two years in office, KIM Dae-jung's administration vigorously implemented 
economic reforms, which enabled the economy to recover swiftly from the 1997-98 crisis. 
KIM Dae-jung followed also an opening policy towards North Korea and in June 2000, a 
historic first south-north summit took place between himself and the North’s leader KIM Jung-
il. The fact that ROH Moo-hyun won last December’s presidential election, augurs well for a 
continuation of the KIM Dae-jung administration's "sunshine policy" of outreach to the North. 
 
1.2 Demography 
 
• Population : 48.3 million (July 2002) 
• Density : 1,271 inhabitants/ km2. (CH= 176 inhabitants/ km2) 
  
About 80 % of the country’s population lives in urban areas. The six most populated South 
Korean cities are : Seoul with 10.78 million, Busan with 3.8 million, Daegu with 2.26 million, 
Inchon with 2.2 million, Kwangju with 1.24 million and Daejin with 1.18 million inhabitants. 
 
                                                          
1  Its legal system combines elements of continental European civil law systems, Anglo-American law, and 
Chinese classical thought. 
 
 2
The South Korean Republic comprises 9 provinces (“do”) and 7 metropolitan cities 
(“gwangyok”). 
 
1.3 Country specificities 
• Economic boom and protectionism 
One astonishing particularity of South Korea is that the country developed itself in only 30 
years, in spite of being one of the poorest countries in the world in the ‘60. This fast 
development is particularly due to massive governmental intervention in industrial, labor and 
credit markets. In the ‘60, the scarcity of private capital, the lack of viable productive 
technologies, and the fragmented nature of the market were the reasons to make such 
involvement almost inevitable. Moving aggressively in the ‘60 to a policy of export-led growth, 
the government tried to support development by directing scarce capital to what it believed to 
be the highest productivity sectors, by protecting domestic industries from foreign 
competition, and by encouraging cooperation between firms to improve production capacities. 
Under President PARK Chung-hee, development was pursued through an authoritarian 
capitalism, in which enterprises were privately owned but the management was shared 
between the government and its owners. This successful development model lost 
effectiveness in the 80s at a time of recession. Long-term problems of inefficiency, moral 
hazard and non-transparency had also become apparent. Tight relationships between the 
government and the huge conglomerates, the Chaebols, led to corruption, to the extent which 
was revealed in damaging political scandals in the mid-90s. 
 
The protectionist policy has been adapted to the WTO’s agreement on basic 
telecommunications services. Foreign equity in ownership has been allowed up to 49% in KT 
since April 2001 and up to 49% for all other telcos since July 1999. These reforms were also 
the consequences of 1997-1998’s worst economic crisis ever experienced by an OECD 
country. The main aim of reforms at that time was to move Korea from a highly interventionist 
and authoritarian model of economic development to a market oriented and open model, 
based on values of consumer choice, democracy, and law. 
 
• Chaebols 
Chaebols are a Korean specificity (which can also be found in Japan). They consist of multi-
company business groups operating in different markets under common entrepreneurial and 
financial control. Although each company is legally independent, the Chaebols  are 
characterized by high levels of ownership by the founding family and by member companies. 
The second characteristic of Chaebols is their diversification across industries. In 1996, the 
top thirty groups had an average of 22 companies operating in 19 different industries. 
Chaebol-affiliated companies are most prevalent in heavy manufacturing industries that 
require large-scale investments, such as cars, electronics and machinery. Third, Chaebols 
are characterized by their high level of debts, a result of their diversification into many 
business lines and their reliance on bank loans. These high debt ratios resulted in large 
financial burdens, making the Chaebols highly vulnerable to slowdowns in demand. Despite 
policies aimed at reducing concentration since the 80s, the share of the top 30 Chaebols in 
the national economy has remained stable since early 80s, at approximately 35%. 
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1.4 Telecom consumption habits 
 
Fixed voice telephony 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Main lines per 100 
inhabitants 
43.27 
 
46.37 48.57 n.d. 
 
Mobile telephony 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Mobile telephony 
subscribers per 100 
inhabitants 
30.19 
 
56.69 62.08 65 
 
Internet 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Personnel computers per 100 
inhabitants 
17.26 
 
24.48 25.65 n.d. 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants (at home, office, 
etc.) 
6.83 
 
41.4 
 
52.11 56.6 
Average surfing time per 
month (hours) 
n.d. 
 
n.d. 19.2 (07.01) 
 
16 (06.02) 
 
Figure 1: Broadband and low-speed Internet 
connections in 2001 (% of users online at home) 
Figure 2: ADSL and cable Internet connections in 
April 2001 (% out of all Internet connections) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the Current state of Play, Australia's 
scorecard, National Office for Information 
Economy Australia, 2002 
 Source: S.H.Kyong, Asian Internet Wave, 
Fukuoka, May 15-16 2001 Internet in Korea: 
current status and trends , data retrieved from 
www. netvalue.com 
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2. Brief telecom history 
2.1 Historical background and liberalization process 
 
The telecom liberalization in South Korea took place in several steps: 
 
1961: Beginning of the 5-year telecommunications plan. Its main objectives were to 
raise the telephone penetration rate, which was extremely low and to increase 
quality of service. 
 
1982: Creation of the Korea Telecommunications Authority (now KT Corp) as a 100% 
government-owned public corporation. The Ministry of Communications is given 
the responsibility for the telecommunications sector. In March: DACOM is created 
by a consortium of public and private interests to provide data communication 
(value-added services) by leasing lines from the Korea Telecommunications 
Authority. 
 
1984: May: Korea Mobile Telecommunications (KMT), KT’s mobile subsidiary, began 
operations. 
 
1990 : Competition for value added network services introduced. 
Beginning of a duopoly for international telephony services (KT + DACOM2). This 
began a process of market differentiation between international, long-distance and 
local telephony services that is still used now, for example in licensing. 
 
1994 : KT’s mobile subsidiary KMT is privatized and becomes SK Telecom (SKT)3. 
Beginning of duopoly for mobile services (SKT, Shinsegi Telecom). 
 December: The Ministry of Communications (MOC) becomes the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC). 
 
1995 : Decision to introduce competition in the national long distance market (KT + 
DACOM). 
 
1996 : New service providers are licensed in particular in the following areas: Leased line 
facility rental (2), international telephony (1, Onse enters international market as 
3rd service provider). 
 
1997 : New service providers licensed in particular in the following areas : Local 
telephony services (1, Hanaro), leased line services (2) and long distance (1, 
Onse). 
MIC introduces changes to stimulate competition in anticipation of the WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement that became effective in 1998. Actions included: 
                                                          
2  DACOM began service on December 3, 1991. 
3  KT has maintained a 9.27% share holding in SKT 
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The granting of a global mobile personal communication by satellite; the increase 
in the number of service providers in five service areas thus introducing 
competition in all basic telecommunication service markets; the revision of the 
classification of telcos and the introduction of a category of « special 
telecommunication service providers » (voice resale, Internet telephone). 
New KT’s mobile subsidiary Korea Telecom Freetel (KTF) enters the market. 
November: Introduction of carrier pre-selection (CPS) for domestic long-distance 
and international calls. 
 
1998 September: the maximum for foreign ownership is increased to 49% for special 
service providers and the government planed to lift the limitation by 2001. 
1999: May: 13% stake in KT is sold, thus raising foreign ownership in the company from 
5% to 19.1% 
 July: MIC raises the foreign-ownership maximum for facility-based carriers from 
33% to 49%. 
2000 1 January: Introduction of universal service and of local loop unbundling (LLU). 
 
2002 May: full privatization of KT which becomes KT Corp. 
 
2.2 Incumbent operator 
 
Listed on the Korea and New York stock exchanges, KT Corp (KT) was the state-owned 
telecom monopoly in Korea, and is still the principal operator in the country, providing 
telephone services, data communications, Internet and satellite services. In 1994, KMT, KT’s 
mobile subsidiary was sold to SK and became SK Telecom. Since 1997, KT has been 
providing mobile telephone services through KT Freetel (KTF), which absorbed competing 
mobile operator Telecom M.com in May 2001. The company’s name was changed from 
Korea Telecom Corp to KT Corp in March 2002. It was fully privatized in May 2002, when the 
government sold its last 28% share. The 15% limitation on individual shareholding was lifted 
in August 2002, and the aggregate foreign ownership limit was raised to 49%. 
 
KT was established on December 10, 1981 under the name Korea Telecommunications 
Authority, in accordance with the Korea Telecommunications Authority Law. 
 
In the early discussion on telecom reform, KT fought hard for the preservation of its 
monopoly. KT announced many arguments, including the maintenance of universal service, 
the waste of resources through duplicative investment, the threat to the R&D system binding 
public corporations, government-sponsored think tank and private companies, and the 
promotion of national champions. The fact that the majority of senior people at KT were from 
former MOC made the implementation of the reform tricky. The implementation of several 
reform agendas were delayed after facing substantial resistance from the management and 
trade union of KT. 
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Privatization of KT has a long history. In the late 1980s the government discussed the 
possibility of privatization, which was expected to yield positive effects on the management of 
KT. The government also viewed privatization as a way to raise government revenue and as 
a result sold 49% of KT to the public. Fluctuations of stock market since the peak of 1989 
caused the delay of privatization of KT. 
 
With the demise of monopoly and the introduction of competition, the status of KT as a public 
corporation and the increasingly strict regulations became a burden for KT. With a view to 
enhance KT’s efficiency in this competitive environment, the government pursued 
privatization. Since 1993, KT’s equities had begun to be sold to the public under the long-
term privatization plan of KT. The original plan was to sell 49% of KT’s shares to the public so 
that the government continued to own the majority of the company’s shares. However, things 
turned out differently. 10% of KT shares were sold in 1993, and another 10% and 8.8% were 
sold in 1994 and 1996 respectively. As of July 1997, the Government held a 71.2 % stake in 
KT. KT was finally fully privatized in May 2002. 
 
Table 1: KT profile 
 
Name KT Corp 
Services Full service: fixed, mobile and Internet 
Ownership % (Nov. 
2002) 
Foreign (Microsoft, Merrill Lynch, etc.): 40.2% 
Treasury: 29.6% 
Domestic (SKT, LG Electronics, Daelim Indust.): 24.5%, ESOA 5.7% 
Market share % Subscribers Call minutes Revenues 
Fixed lines    
Subscriber line,  
July 20021 
96% N/A n.d. 
Long-distance, June 
20021 
N/A n.d.  85% 
International, June 
20021 
N/A n.d.  67.2% 
Mobile (KTF), 
November 20021 
32.4% n.d. n.d. 
Internet    
ADSL, November 
20022 
45.8%  N/A n.d.  
 
1 Telecoms country Report: South Korea, World Market Research Center, 17 January 2003 
2 Korea leads broadband Internet service market, YANG Sung-jin, Korea Herald,  November 13, 2002 
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2.3 Main competing operators 
 
2.3.1 Fixed voice telephony 
• Local telephony market 
Korea’s local telephony market is currently duopolistic, with KT and Hanaro Telecom (entry in 
April 1999) competing with each other. However, market competition is almost absent, as KT 
dominates most segments. 
 
As of July 2002, KT accounted for 96% of the market share, based on the number of 
subscribers, and Hanaro Telecom a poor 4%. This is in fact a monopolistic situation. This is 
because Hanaro’s strategy and goals focus on the delivery of Internet services such as ADSL 
and cable modem services rather than on local telephone service in competition with KT. 
Even though Hanaro acquired the license in the local service market, local telephony is only a 
component of ADSL bundling service. 
 
The ultimate reason behind Hanaro’s negligent market share is that securing a subscriber 
base takes much time and requires high investment costs. In this respect, MIC introduced a 
new provision in the Telecommunications Business Act (TBA) in January 2001 setting forth 
the mandatory access to subscription line of facility-based service providers to promote 
competition in the market. In addition, MIC laid a foundation under the TBA for providing 
number portability under the TBA, which will start in 2003. 
 
• Domestic long-distance telephony market 
Korea’s domestic long distance service sector was transformed from KT’s monopolistic 
structure to a competitive structure when DACOM and Onse Telecom launched their 
operations in 1996 and December 1999 respectively. This produced positive results on behalf 
of the end-users, bringing down prices and improving the quality of the calls. 
 
However, the demand for domestic long distance service has been steadily decreasing, as 
users are increasingly shifting toward mobile phone services. This is because the price 
competitiveness of domestic long distance services is not great enough to outweigh the 
convenience offered by mobile telephony service. 
 
As of June 2002, KT had the largest market share based on revenue with 85%, followed by 
DACOM with about 11% and Onse Telecom with about 4%. Since 1999, however, KT’s share 
has been declining in favor of DACOM. 
 
This evolution seems to be the result of the carrier pre-selection feature introduced in 
November 1997 and of differentiation strategies which prompted the shift in consumer 
demand. 
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• International telephony market 
This is the market in which competition is most intense among all fixed telecommunications 
service markets. In addition to KT, DACOM and Onse Telecom, more than 50 special service 
providers such as voice resale and web-phone entered the market after 1998, which lead to 
further accelerated price drops and other forms of market competition. 
 
Due to the growth of DACOM and Onse Telecom, KT’s market share declines constantly. As 
of June 2002, KT’s market share reached about 67%, followed by DACOM with about 23% 
and Onse with about 10%, based on revenue. 
 
2.3.2 Mobile telephony 
 
The mobile telephony market has been growing steadily since its liberalization in 1996, but 
with a penetration rate of about 61% as of 2001, we can deem that the market is approaching 
its maturity stage. 3 competitors are currently in this market: 
 
• SK Telecom (cellular service provider): Which acquired KT’s former mobile subsidiary, 
Korea Mobile Telecom in 1994. In 2001 SKT merged with the mobile operator Shinsegi 
Telecom4. 
• KT Freetel (KTF) (PCS provider): New mobile subsidiary of KT which merged with 
Korea Telecom M.com (KTM) in May 2001. 
• LG Telecom (PCS provider). 
 
In recent years KTF has been losing ground in South Korea’s mobile market to SKT. The 
bitter rivalry between the two intensified in 2002 when market leader SKT pulled further away 
from its rivals and consolidated its position as the country’s most popular telco. Indeed, in 
November 2002 its market was of 52.8% up from 50.8 % in September 2001. During the 
same period KTF’s market shares grew from 29.8% to 32.4%, leaving LG with 14.8%. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of Korean Mobile market share 
Source: National statistical Office, adopted from www.american.edu/carmel/jl2216a/T1.html and World 
Market Research Center, Telecoms country report: South Korea, January 17, 2003 
 
                                                          
4  SK’s acquisition of Shinsegi Telecom was given a conditional approval by the Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) in April 2001. The conditions were lowering of market share to below 50% by June 2001 and limiting 
purchase of mobile handset by SK Teletek to 1.2 million units/year by 2005 
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Finally we can notice that wherever you are in Korea you’ll have mobile networks. Indeed 
telcos made big investments even in areas with poor population densities. 
 
2.3.3 Internet 
 
• Broadband 
Korea is leading the global broadband access in terms of user base and technology. In 
October 2002, the number of high-speed Internet subscribers surpassed 10 million. This is an 
incredible result in just four years since the formal high-speed service was launched (in June 
1998, Korea Thrunet Corp., a broadband carrier implemented the so-called cable-based 
online access service5). A significant growth momentum appeared in April 1999 when Hanaro 
Telecom Inc., the country’s second largest fixed-line and broadband carrier introduced its 
ADSL service. KT followed in June 1999. In November 2002, KT controlled 45.6% of the 
ADSL market, Hanaro 28.6% and Thrunet 13.1%. 
 
MIC claims that about 98% of local administrative districts have high-speed Internet access, 
largely because ADSL utilizes existing copper-wire telephone lines and tends to spread fast 
among local residents. As of end-December 2001, the high-speed Internet user rate in Korea 
was 17.16%, the largest in the world followed by Canada (8.4%), Sweden (4.96%), the USA 
(4.47%) and Japan (2.23%).6 
 
Figure 4: High speed Internet user rate, December 2001 
Source: MIC in Korea Herald, 13 November 2002 
 
Major factors which enabled such a phenomenal growth were: First, geographical 
advantages that facilitated expansion of the high-speed Internet service7, second, the 
lowering of tariffs due to regulatory intervention, and third, efforts to increase the number of 
                                                          
5  Cable Internet represents currently 27% of high-speed Internet subscribers 
6  The Korea Herald, Korea leads brodband Internet service market, November 13, 2002 
7  At the end of 2000, 46.3% or 21.35 million of Korea’s population were concentrated in the metropolitan area 
with population density of Seoul being 15.342 persons per km2, which is comparably high. Furthermore, 50% 
of households live in apartments 
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PCs nationwide and to narrow the digital divide in accordance with the governmental 
computerization policy. 
 
The ADSL field is quite competitive because it is a new service in which there is no “lock-in 
phenomena” (predominance of the first player because of consumers’ confidence) and 
competitors entered the market more or less at the same time. 
 
“Cyber Korea 21” aimed to provide universal access to broadband by 2002. Korea is now set 
to migrate from ADSL to VDSL service, a next generation of high-speed Internet technology. 
In a new initiative, 85% of homes should have 20'000 kbps connections (VDSL connections) 
by 2005. The Government has offered low interest loans to network providers in rural areas 
and mandated broadband installation in new apartment buildings. 
 
In brief, over half of all subscribers are signed on to xDSL services, with a significant 
proportion accessing the Internet at high speed over cable modem connections. LAN (Local 
Area Network), B-WILL (Broadband wireless local loop) and satellite connections (particularly 
in rural areas and on the islands) also have some success. 
 
• Wireless Internet 
Wireless Internet markets have rapidly grown in Korea enhanced by the high penetration rate 
of cellular phones and the remarkable adaptation of broadband Internet. 
 
The Korean wireless Internet is particularly designed for access by individuals. By using SFA 
(Sales Force Automation), they can get hold of any information, anytime, and anywhere. It 
also allows consumers to do their business through a mobile commerce system that enables 
financial transactions, including purchasing merchandise. The varieties of wireless Internet 
services that are already in use, or are in trial services in Korea, cover every area of users' 
daily lives such as tax inquiry, mobile security, and trading and agency services8. 
 
On December 5, 2002, MIC said it has decided to adopt a single wireless Internet access 
platform as the first country in the world. The ministry would revise a telecommunications law 
for the adoption of WIPI, or wireless Internet platform for interoperability, after gathering 
opinions from the World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. Since Korea is going 
to be the first country to adopt the common wireless Internet access platform, consensus on 
a whole series of issues among the WTO member countries is necessary, as the MIC pointed 
out.9 
 
Korea is without a doubt a global leader in wireless technologies and this success can be 
attributed to well-deployed Internet infrastructure and the continuous development of new 
technologies obviously enhanced by the government. 
 
Table 2: Main competing operators on the Korean telecommunications market 
 
                                                          
8  Source: Korea Times: Korea taking global initiative in wireless Internet, NHO Joon-hun, June 5, 2002 
9  Source: Korea Times: Korea to adopt single wireless internet platform, KIM Deok-Hyun, December 6, 2002 
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Name Ownership Nationwide market share 
Fixed Telephony   
DACOM (Long-distance / Intl), 
revenue base 
n.d. ~11% / ~23%1 (June 2002) 
11% / 30%2 (December 2001) 
Onse Telecom (Long-
distance/Intl), revenue base 
Lotte: 9.07% 
Iljin: 9.88% 
Kohap: 7.25% 
(as of February 2002) 
~4% / ~10%1 (June 2002) 
4% / 19%2 (December 2001) 
Hanaro Telecom (local), 
subscribers base 
LG Group: 13.8% 
Samsung Group: 9% 
Daewoo Securities: 4.6% 
LG Insurance: 3% 
Foreigners: 5.2% (JP Morgan, 
UBS Warbung,, etc.) 
Others: 58.6% 
(as of February 2003, Hanaro 
Website) 
4%3 (July 2002) 
Mobile telephony (subscribers 
base, November 2002)3 
  
SK Telecom SK Group: 32.57% 
Citibank ADR: 13.85% 
KT Corp: 9.27% 
(as of November 20023) 
52.8%  
LG Telecom  14.8%  
Broadband (ADSL, Cable, 
LAN, B-WLL) (subscribers 
base, June 2002)3 
  
Hanaro n.d.  26.3% 
Korea Thrunet n.d.  14.1% 
(Dreamline, DACOM, 
Telecom) 
n.d.  12.5% 
 
1 June 2002, estimation 
2 December 2001, in “Telecom market liberalization and market entry”, ITU Regional Regulatory Seminar, August 
5-8, 2002, Dalian, China 
3 Telecoms country Report: South Korea, World Market Research Center (WMRC), January 17, 2003 
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3. Legal framework 
3.1 Supranational level 
 
Supranational organizations have very little influence on Korean regulatory policies and laws. 
However, Korea is a member of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) with members 
like Japan or the USA. APEC is an association of regional economies established in 1989 to 
promote trade liberalization and economic cooperation. APEC covers a range of economic 
sectors through 10 different working groups, one being the Telecommunications and 
Information Working Group (TEL). 
 
The TEL provides an important mechanism among APEC member economies for exchanging 
information, consulting on policy and regulatory developments, and developing cooperative 
projects in the telecommunications sector. The TEL works closely with the business sector, 
policy makers and newly-formed regulatory authorities to accelerate telecommunications 
reform. It recognizes that this reform will be achieved through sharing experiences and 
developing 'best practice' approaches. 
 
The TEL has made significant contributions to the reduction of structural and regulatory 
barriers to free trade in telecommunications services, equipment and investment. 
One major activity is the implementation of a Mutual recognition Arrangement (MRA), which 
facilitates trade in telecommunications equipment. The MRA began in July 1999 after being 
endorsed by Ministers in July 1998. 
 
APEC Ministers responsible for the telecommunications and the information industries 
provide high level policy directions. Major initiatives resulting from those meetings include: 
 
• agreement on the key elements of a fully liberalized telecommunications services 
sector; 
• endorsement of principles for enhancing universal access to telecommunications and 
transparent funding of universal service obligations; 
• agreement on a set of principles on International Charging Arrangements for Internet 
Services (Internet Bandwidth Charging Arrangements - ICAIS); 
• agreement on APEC principles on interconnection policy in the APEC region; and  
• endorsement of a Reference Framework for Action on E-Commerce to support the 
growth of electronic commerce, including the development of compatible approaches to 
the authentication of digital signatures. 
 
As we can notice, APEC agreements mostly consist in general principles and 
recommendations which have absolutely not the same influence or impact as EU directives. 
Indeed, their goal is absolutely not to apply as legal provisions, they are too general for this; 
furthermore as of yet there is no construction project of a regional legal framework as it is the 
case for the EU. 
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3.2 General national framework for telecommunications 
 
The two key acts for telecommunication services are the Telecommunication Basic Act (BA) 
and the Telecommunications Business Act (TBA), both enacted on December 30, 1983 and 
revised for the first time on January 28, 2000. The TBA was last modified on November 12, 
2002 through parliament’s vote and this revision will be applicable in April 2003. 
 
The purpose of the BA is to contribute to the enhancement of public welfare by managing 
telecommunications effectively and stimulating the development of telecommunications (Art 
1). A significant portion of the Act is taken up by articles on the promotion of 
telecommunication technology, promotion of research, technical criteria (standards), 
providing MIC with authority to adopt new telecommunication modes (Article 28 “1), 
promotion of standardization (Art 29), type approval issues, etc. For regulatory reform, the 
TBA is more relevant than the BA because it is concerned with defining types of 
telecommunication business, licensing, cancellation of licenses, telecommunication business 
practices, promotion of competition among telcos, the installation and maintenance of 
telecommunication facilities and penal provisions. Transparency would be facilitated through 
the merging of the two acts, at least as regarding provisions relevant to telecommunication 
networks and services and enhancing competition in telecommunication services. 
 
The BA created the Korean Communication Commission (KCC) in 1992. In addition to KCC, 
an Information and Communication Policy Deliberation Council was set up within the Ministry 
as an advisory body in areas such as licensing. In Art. 12 the BA presents the double mission 
of the MIC: Enhancing consumer’s benefits and supporting the industry in the 
telecommunication field. 
 
Until 2000, there was a third Act, the so-called Telecommunications Construction Business 
Act which specified that the construction of telecommunications facilities should be done by 
specialized construction companies independent of the telcos. This requirement was a 
means of providing special privileges to the construction industry. It was firmly criticized by 
the telcos who blamed the Act for raising costs to the end-users and reducing potential 
economies of scale and scope of telcos by constraining their flexibility in facility construction. 
Many telcos argued that the Act imposed an unnecessary requirement on the industry and 
should better be abolished in order to allow them to determine how best to construct their 
own infrastructure. The Telecommunications Constructions Business Act was abolished in 
2000 and legal provisions for the construction of facilities are now included in the TBA.  
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Table 3: Characteristics of the South Korean Telecommunications Law 
 
BA 
General provisions 
Art 1  
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the enhancement of the 
public welfare by managing telecommunications efficiently and 
stimulating the development of telecommunications by providing 
basic matters on telecommunications. 
BA 
Major provisions 
 
Basic guiding principles on telecommunications 
Ministerial authority regarding promotion of telecommunications 
Technology and technical standards for telecommunication 
facilities 
Management of telecommunication networks 
Organization and operation of KCC 
 
TBA 
General Provisions 
Art 1 
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the promotion of public 
welfare by encouraging sound development of telecommunications 
business and ensuring convenience to the users of 
telecommunications service through proper management of such 
business 
TBA 
Major provisions 
Licensing criteria and reporting procedures for telcos 
Telcos competition safeguards 
Rights of telecommunication service users 
Construction and maintenance of telecommunications facilities 
Universal service 
(Art 2 (1) 3.) 
The term Universal service means the basic telecommunications 
service which any user may receive at reasonable fees anytime and 
anywhere 
 
Further the Act states that all telcos are obliged to contribute to 
providing universal service 
Interconnection 
regulation 
 
Calculation methodology: Based on fully distributed costs (FDC) of 
telecommunications network costs 
Unbundling 
Local: Local exchange, local transmission, subscriber lines. 
Long distance: Toll exchange, toll transmission, line between local 
station to toll exchange 
 
4. Key regulation actors 
4.1 Regulatory bodies 
 
The Korean regulatory situation is very particular, a unique case among the OECD members. 
There are two different bodies responsible for regulation of telecommunications, the MIC 
(Ministry) and the KCC (part of the MIC). Till now the MIC gives all authorizations (in matter 
of licensing, interconnection, penalties, etc.) and the KCC is a kind of arbitration and 
investigation body under the control of the MIC, i.e. even if its decisions are usually enforced, 
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they are controlled by the MIC. Koreans say about the KCC that it is a half-independent body; 
in fact for now, it is absolutely not independent and its regulatory powers and resources 
(especially in terms of staff) are very weak. This situation is currently changing (notably with 
TBA revision adopted by the parliament in November 2002 and applicable in April 2003). 
 
4.1.1 Ministry of information and communication 
The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) is responsible for telecommunication 
policy and regulation. It is also responsible for broadcasting policy, for operating postal 
services, and postal saving and insurance services. The MIC also has broad powers over 
industry promotion in the information and communication industry, and in particular in the IT 
manufacturing and software industries. The MIC’s mandate includes the promotion of 
research and development and the responsibility for equipment type approval. The ministry 
has a number of advisory bodies, including the Korea Information Society Development 
Institute (KISDI), which is considered as an expertise body for telecom related market and 
competition issues. 
 
In spite of the existence of the KCC, the MIC still maintains most of the regulatory functions 
(license issuing, authorization of interconnection, spectrum planning and allocation, 
numbering, price regulation, universal service and monitoring service quality) in addition to its 
traditional “guidance” and industry promotion policies. Thus, MIC maintains two objectives 
that are potentially conflicting: to protect users’ interest and to ensure sound industry 
development. This means that, unlike other OECD countries where the major objective of the 
regulator is to maximize users’ interests, MIC’s efforts in the telecommunication service 
sector can be subject to other industry pressures. 
 
Continued progress in reform and in reducing direct governmental intervention requires by 
law the separation of the regulatory function from industry promotion functions, for example 
through an amendment to the BA. Adaptations are en route. 
 
4.1.2 Korea Communication Commission (KCC)  
 
• Foundation and history 
The Korea Communications Commission (KCC) was established by Art. 37 BA in March 
1992. From 1992 to November 1996, the KCC’s main responsibility was to review major 
policies of the government on information and telecommunications, which included licensing 
of telecommunications service carriers. Revisions to the BA, which came into effect in 
January 1997, state that the KCC is a regulatory body in charge of ensuring fair competition 
in the telecommunications field. These revisions increased the power of the KCC in terms of 
numbering and financial statement. 
 
• Structure  
The KCC may have a maximum of 9 Commissioners including the Chairman and one 
Standing Commissioner. Currently, it has 7 Commissioners (a lawyer, a judge, an economist, 
two professors, a member related with consumer protection and a government official). All 
Commissioners, including the Chairman (currently YOON Seung-young) are appointed by the 
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President with the recommendations of the Minister of Information and Communication. The 
term of the Commissioners except for the government official is every 3 years renewable. 
The Chairman presides over all the KCC meetings; coordinates and organizes the work of 
the Commission, and represents the agency in legislative matters and in relations with other 
governmental departments and agencies. In 1997, a secretariat was established which 
supports the KCC and carries out investigations on unfair competition practices; it is 
composed of 5 divisions: General Affairs, Inquiry, Arbitration, Investigation I and II. There are 
25 staff members including the Chief of the Secretariat. The Secretariat also has the 
Complaint Center for telecommunications service users, which is operated by two assigned 
staff members. 
 
• Legal attributions, responsibilities and duties 
 
The KCC has 3 major functions: Arbitration, inquiry and investigations 
 
• First, the KCC arbitrates disputes between telcos regarding the provision of facilities, 
interconnection, collocation of facilities, provision of information related with the 
facilities, and disputes between telcos and consumers. KCC makes exclusive (quasi-
jurisdictional) decisions on arbitration. 
 
• Second, the KCC deliberates on the establishment or revision of rules related to fair 
competition, on provision of facilities, interconnection, collocation, provision of 
information related with facilities, on agreements between telcos on above mentioned 
matters, and proposes corrective measures against unfair practices such as denial of 
interconnection, non-fulfillment of agreement, misuse of information, violation of service 
contract and damage to consumer benefits. 
 
The KCC then sends the results of deliberation to the Minister of Information and 
Communication and the Minister issues a corrective order. 
 
• Third, the KCC investigates on unfair practices. 
 
The KCC can make binding decisions. For example, when it arbitrates between companies, 
its decisions cannot be overturned by the Minister. The Minister can request that a decision 
on unfair business practices is reconsidered, but if 2/3rds of the Commission agree then the 
initial decision is final; this proceeding never happened. This possibility will disappear in April 
with the new law. The KCC is responsible for reviewing the telecommunication numbering 
plan and for accounting standards. 
 
The KCC is not equivalent to many European telecommunications regulators, it is an integral 
part of the MIC and largely plays an advisory role with a minimum of regulatory power; its 
independence mentioned on the KCC’s website and on documents is relative. The KCC’s 
powers are indirect, based on its ability to undertake reviews and sanction individual abuses. 
As a result, it tends to be reactive rather than proactive, responding to complaints since it 
does not have the authority to ensure that appropriate conditions and safeguards are in place 
for competition to develop. However, the KCC has the power to take action against 
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companies deemed to be engaging in unfair competition and to sanction, including fine these 
companies. Art. 37 BA allows the KCC to impose these fines. 
 
The creation of the KCC has been an important step towards improving the institutional 
structure of regulation. Further steps have recently been taken in order to create a more 
effective independent regulatory body that is able to create and maintain the conditions for 
effective competition that maximizes user welfare. The total independence of the KCC could 
be achieved by separating the KCC from the MIC, accompanied by a reallocation and a clear 
demarcation of responsibilities between the MIC and the KCC. The KCC, in order to become 
a complete regulatory body should receive the competencies in terms of licensing, price 
controls and interconnection, overseeing policies on universal service and the implementation 
of other regulatory safeguards. Autonomy of the KCC in terms of budget and staff would be 
necessary.  
 
It is important to point out that there is a consensus among industry players for the necessity 
to transform the KCC into a fully independent body in order to ensure fair and transparent 
regulatory rule making in the telecommunication service sector. 
 
Notably, with the new revisions package (applicable in April 2003), some of the former MIC’s 
competencies are transferred to the KCC. The articles of the TBA concerned with those 
modifications are as follows: Art. 34-6, 36, 36-2, 36-4, 37, 37-2. In brief, the KCC will have the 
power to give agreements in matter of interconnection, will receive each year telcos’ business 
reports, decide to investigate or not, request the useful data of the telcos for an investigation. 
The KCC will also be able to order some measures (Art 37 (1)); especially, change of 
contents of an agreement between telcos, suspension of prohibited acts, public 
announcement of a prohibited act receiving a correction order, measures necessary for 
restoring the violated matters due to the prohibited acts to their original status, such as the 
removal of telecommunications facilities. In addition, the KCC will have the power to impose 
penalties without receiving any authorization from the MIC. The number of fines might 
therefore increase substantially. 
 
• Resources 
 
Financing: The KCC’s budget is financed through the government budget adopted each year 
by the Assembly. 
 
Staff: The KCC is significantly understaffed compared to other OECD countries regulators. It 
only has about 25 employees and therefore is constrained in the number and depth of the 
initiatives it can take. In addition, since the staff is a part of the MIC, it is difficult to expect that 
they will act independently on the MIC’s policies. The personnel turnover is very low, only 2 
people have quitted their job so far. About 30% of the staff has special backgrounds in IT. In 
Korea, people working in the private field generally do not like to work as civil servants and 
reciprocally, therefore, there is no “captions problem”, i.e. that decisions or plans of the KCC 
are unlikely to be illegally transmitted to the incumbent or other telcos. 
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4.2 Competition authority 
 
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) was established in 1981. The KFTC is 
administratively attached to the Prime Minister and is composed of nine tenured 
Commissioners. It is the administrative body responsible for competition policy in Korea. In 
2000, the personnel of the KFTC was of 444 people (401 regular employees) and its budget 
was of 193 billion KRW (about 140.5 million €)10. 
 
Although, the MIC is the authority responsible for anti-competitive behavior in the 
telecommunications sector, it is not the only one. Since the sector is subject to Korea’s basic 
competition law, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in which there are 
specific articles about telecommunications (e.g. essential facility). The TBA and the MRFTA 
have overlapping articles. In order to avoid possible conflicts between the KFTC and the KCC 
in matter of conflict resolutions, both institutions signed agreements with each other in 1999 
and 2001 in order to clarify their respective prerogatives. The agreements specified that the 
KFTC was in charge of regulating general unfair competitive behavior (in terms of M&A and 
advertising) and that the KCC was in charge of specialized cases related to 
telecommunications competition, for example, privatization, prices rate, rights of way, etc. 
 
In 2000, the KFTC launched the “Clean market project” which aimed to concentrate the 
KFTC’s capacity on detecting anticompetitive elements in selected industries that were 
harming consumers. This project had the goal that such industries ultimately become pro-
competitive.11 In 2001, the selected industry sector was the telecommunications sector. The 
KCC objected to this plan because it fond that the KFTC was going beyond its prerogatives. 
The KFTC had to explain clearly the contents of the project and then both institutions made 
an informal agreement to end the conflict. 
 
KFTC’s action 
 
 
A recent example of unfair practice handled by the KFTC could be the following: on October 
13, 2002, the KFTC fined the country’s largest mobile operator SKT 2.08 billion KRW (about 
1,500 €) for using slanderous advertisements against its main competitor KTF. The KFTC 
also ordered SKT to post apologies in the national press after ruling that it violated fair 
competition rules. The case originated with advertisements edited by KTF in July 2002 which 
cited a mobile industry ranking compiled by the U.S. magazine BusinessWeek that claimed, 
KTF’s growth in recent years had outpaced other mobile carriers including SKT. SKT 
responded immediately by launching its own advertisements questioning KTF’s claim with a 
series of sarcastic slogans, including one which accused its competitor of only thinking ‘KTF-
wise’. KFTC ruled that BusinessWeek had used Standard & Poor’s data to calculate the 
rankings and that SKT’s advertisement about KTF distorted the facts, thus damaging KTF’s 
corporate image and violating a series of advertising regulations.12 
                                                          
10 See www.oanda.com, online money converter. Exchange rate, May 15, 2003: 1€ = 1374 WON 
11  Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Korea (2000), KFTC, October 2001 
12  Source : CIT Communications Update, October 14, 2002 
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Again in 2000, 703 cases of business M&A (e.g. business combinations among affiliated 
companies, conglomerate merger of large scale business group) were handled, among which 
the case of Shinsegi Telecom’s stocks acquirement by SKT. This combination boosted the 
companies’ market shares to 56.9% with SKT taking 42.7% and Shinsegi 14.2%. The merger 
was feared to aggravate market concentration and there was a concern that the merger might 
cause the flocking of subscribers to the combined operator due to the industry-specific 
external network effect. Considering this, the KFTC realized that rather than unilateral 
prohibition of business combinations, maximizing the benefits to be derived from it would be 
better. Under this recognition, KFTC ordered SKT to reduce its market share to less than 
50% by June 30, 2001. 
 
The KFTC’s decisions can be appealed to the Court of Administrative Litigation. For example, 
SKT once appealed an injunction with administrative fines for constraining behavior and won. 
About 20% of the KFTC’s decisions go to court; the process of appeal takes usually about 1 
year but it does not seem to hinder the KFTC’s work. Decisions of the Court of Administrative 
Litigation may then be appealed to the Supreme Court. It is important to notice that a fined 
company can ask for fine suspension if such a fine is dangerous for its survival on the 
market. This has rarely happened till now, certainly because of the low amounts of fines. 
 
4.3 Judiciary 
 
The KCC’s decisions can normally be overruled by the MIC but if 2/3 of the KCC’s 
Commissioners think that the decision is right, the decision is confirmed. This possibility will 
disappear in the new TBA law effective in April 2003. 
 
Another way for the KCC’s decisions to be overruled is through an appeal to the Court of 
Administrative Litigation, which has never happened. 
 
The MIC’s decisions can be appealed to the Court of Administrative Litigation, but even if the 
Court finds out important failings in the decisions, it can only recommend the MIC to cancel 
the concerned decisions. In this sense, the Court cannot overrule the MIC’s decisions. There 
has been no report of this kind of appeal until now. 
 
4.4 Competing operators 
 
There are several organizations representing the telecom industry in Korea, but all of them 
have more or less close links to the government. The Korean political context does not leave 
a lot of room for questioning or consensus building, which is why there is very little debate 
around the regulatory decisions made by the Ministry. Most of the time, decisions are 
enforced without any official complaints and if there are any, they are mostly neglected. 
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5. Regulatory functions 
5.1 Allocation of scarce resources 
 
5.1.1 Frequencies 
The MIC is responsible for spectrum planning and allocation. The legal basis for the MIC’s 
authority is the Radio Wave Act. A number of important changes have taken place over the 
last decade in the policies used to allocate frequencies. The policy in 1991 was for the MIC to 
provide ex post information on the detailed allocation of spectrum bandwidths, selection of 
the operators and allocation of spectrum within given bandwidths. Recent changes in 
spectrum allocation policy have improved the transparency of the allocation procedures. At 
present, the MIC decides on the number of operators for available bandwidths and publicizes 
the number of licenses to be issued and the application procedures. Licenses are allocated 
through a competitive tender procedure. 
 
5.1.2 Rights-of-way 
Facility-based operators can submit a request to the MIC (Art 18 (3) TBA) to use land or 
structures owned by the state, local governments, government-owned institutions or other 
facility based operators when an agreement cannot be reached by the operator and other 
parties. The Minister of the MIC can order other institutions to consult with operators in the 
context of rights of way and these institutions need to comply with this request. The MIC also 
has recommended to mobile operators to share antennae sites. 
 
5.2 Enhancing competition 
 
5.2.1 Licensing 
The licensing classification system adopted in April 1995 determines two categories of 
services: Value-added services that require notification (on application) and facility-based 
services that require authorization (after a first notification). 
 
Further streamlining and improvement in this classification and licensing system was 
introduced in late 1997. The current licensing classification system requires authorization for 
facility-based providers, registration for special service providers and notification of value-
added network providers. Licenses for fixed facility-based services are differentiated by the 
type of service offered (local, long-distance, and international). In other words, a prospective 
licensee needs to apply for multiple licenses if it whishes to offer local, long-distance and 
international services. 
 
The procedure to obtain a license takes place in several steps: 
 
• Application: 2 times in a year, between the 25th and 31st of March and between the 
25th and 30th of September. 
• Decisions on feasibility of licensing are based on public interests, laws, regulations, and 
availability of spectrum. Notifications are issued on April 30 and on October 31. 
• Licensing procedure:  
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• Phase 1: Qualification, business plan: Foreign ownership (up to 49%); financial and 
technical capability; user protection 
• Phase 2: Spectrum fee 
• Notification of selection on June 30 and on December 31. 
• Issue of license: Registration of capital, deposit of spectrum fee, etc., according to 
relevant laws13. 
3G 
 
There has been a big controversy in Korea about the choice of 3G Technology. Two 
technologies were indeed in competition: the European and Japanese W-CDMA and the 
Qualcomm’s CDMA2000 favored by the Korean government itself. 
 
Three 3G licenses were to be awarded. Two were attributed on December 15, 2000 to SK 
Telecom (SK IMT) and KT (KT ICOM), the number one and two mobile operators in the 
country; SKT and KTF were allowed to use W-CDMA as specified on their license 
application. LG and Hanaro failed to win the third license mainly because of technical 
insufficiencies. 
 
The government wanted at least one of the three 3G Operators to deploy CDMA2000. For 
the second contest it had to choose between applications from LG which was pushing for a 
W-CDMA deployment and Hanaro Telecom, the only bidder to submit an application based 
on CDMA2000. Finally LG, already a consortium consisting of 767 companies, teamed up 
with Hanaro in a second consortium which became the only candidate to bid this time for a 
CDMA2000 mobile license. 
 
The MIC rejected LG’s request for a lower fee, 220 billion KRW (about 160 million €) instead 
of 1.15 trillion KRW (about 836 million €). However, LG was finally allowed to pay 220 billion 
KRW upfront and pay the rest over 15 years in installments worth one to three percent of its 
sales. 
 
Finally on August 25, 2001, LG Telecom was awarded the last 3G license (CDMA2000). LG 
Telecom is the country's smallest wireless service provider and analysts cast doubts on LG’s 
ability to compete with the two giants. Nevertheless, the country is keen to implement both 
W-CDMA and CDMA2000 technologies. 
 
South Korean mobile operators are planning to launch their 3G services in 2003. SKT's 3G 
subsidiary, SK IMT, has announced that it will launch a commercial 3G service in Q3 of 2003.  
 
5.2.2 Granting access to infrastructures to new companies 
• Interconnection rates and agreements 
After competition was introduced under the TBA in December 1996, regulations related to 
interconnection and access were gradually provided as well. Currently, when a carrier 
                                                          
13  Source: , LEE Ki-joo, Telecom market liberalization and market entry, ITU Regional Regulatory Seminar, 5-8 
August 2002, Dalian, China 
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possesses facilities essential for other carriers in delivering services and has a dominant 
market share and size of operation, it falls under the criteria set by the decree of the MIC. 
The decree requires the dominant carrier to accept the request from another carrier for the 
provision of telecommunications facilities, the sharing of subscriber lines, the sharing of 
wireless facilities, interconnection, etc. 
 
KT and SKT are presently subject to the mandatory provision of access and interconnection. 
They are required to have an access/ interconnection agreement between them and with 
other operators and follow the criteria set by the MIC. If no agreement is reached within the 
specified period (90 days), either of the parties may request the KCC’s arbitration. 
 
Generally interconnection charges are calculated by unbundled service elements based on 
historical and fully distributed cost (FDC). From 2000, interconnection charges of fixed 
operators and mobile operators are determined by applying X factor (annual discount rate) to 
interconnection charges calculated by the cost of the previous year. X factors are 3% for 
domestic, 10% for long distance and 8% for mobile telephony. The application of a cost-
based methodology to the mobile network cuts down the interconnection charges of mobile 
network operators by 28% in 2000. 
 
The LRIC method will be applied for 2004 interconnection rate calculation. If this change had 
already been adopted, the impact on KT would have been an increase in revenue by 
approximately 9 billion KRW (about 6.5 million €) in 2002 and a decrease in revenue of 
approximately 9 billion KRW in 2003 comparing to revenue of 324 billion KRW (about 235 
million €) in 2001. 
 
• Leased lines 
The market for leased lines is increasing rapidly due to the development of new 
telecommunication services and new communication business entities entering the market. 
At the end of 2000, the number of leased lines was 595,368, spread among 6 leased line 
service providers that include KT, DACOM, Korea Thrunet and Powercom among others. 
Total revenues for leased lines were of 1,024.7 billion KRW (about 745 million €). 
 
As of end 2001, KT had 67% of market shares, Powercom 10% and others 23% together.14 
 
In spite of important price drops since 1998 and the liberalization, large price differences 
remain within the OECD. Indeed the Nordic countries have the lowest charges, at about one-
quarter of the OECD average. The Czech and Slovak Republics have charges of at least 
twice the OECD average. Korea is the third most expensive country among OECD countries 
and the first in our eight case studies. 
 
                                                          
14  Source: Telecom market liberalization and market entry, LEE Ki-joo, ITU Regional Regulatory Seminar, 
August 5-8, 2002, Dalian, China 
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Leased lines high prices are often considered to be a reason for ADSL difficulties to spread in 
a country. The case of Korea refutes this explanation and shows that ADSL development is 
more a question of will (government, incumbent, IT policy). 
 
Figure 5: Price index of Leased lines, basket of national leased lines of 2 megabits per second, OECD 
average 100, source OECD 
 
 
 
• Unbundling 
In December 2000, the TBA mandated a new obligation to major telcos to provide their 
unbundled elements to competitors. Furthermore, the Government finalized the details of the 
obligation and relevant pricing scheme in December 2001, so that unbundling obligation is 
now effective de jure as well as de facto in the Korean marketplace. 
 
It is noteworthy that Korea enacted its statutory and regulatory requirements for dominating 
broadband facility-based service suppliers (KT, Hanaro and Thrunet) to provide unbundled 
network elements to their competitors when the country was already well on its way to 
leading the world in broadband access penetration rates. 
 
The rapid and widespread development of ADSL was the result of strong political will and 
was made possible among others by the high number of technicians (2500) trained by KT to 
install ADSL. In 2000 alone, more than 2 million ADSL connections were installed. This lead 
to fierce competition between cable modem and ADSL technologies.  
 
The goals of compulsory unbundling were to enhance competition in the ADSL segment, 
largely dominted by KT, Hanaro and Thrunet and to ensure high levels of innovation and 
investment in the broadband sector.  
 
As for fixed telephony, unbundling has not lead to a major evolution of market shares so far, 
which is also true for many other countries were unbundling was made compulsory a fey 
years ago.  
 
5.2.3 Facilitating access to customers for new companies 
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• Carrier pre-selection and call-by-call carrier selection 
The Korean government took over the management of numbering resources in 1991 when 
the telecommunications market first opened to competition. For domestic long distance and 
international calls, the MIC has authorized carrier pre-selection since November 1997. To 
increase transparency and ensure fairness, the MIC established the “Long Distance Carrier 
Pre-selection Registration Center” responsible for changing and maintaining records to pre-
selection in July 1999. Users can now register with the Center if they wish to change their 
pre-selected carrier. This is an important service, because for example KT used 
discriminatory verification to review customer request forms to change carriers. Local carrier 
pre-selection will be introduced during the year 2003. 
 
• Number portability 
Recognizing the difficulty of introducing competition in local loop without number portability 
(NP), which allows customers to reduce the transaction cost of changing service provider, the 
government announced a detailed plan to implement NP in fixed telecommunication services 
in January 2001 (amendment of the TBA) and for the mobile market in January 2002. 
 
However the proceedings took time and it was only in August 2002 that the MIC announced 
that it will gradually introduce NP in the mobile telephony: 
 
- NP for the mobile service will be introduced first for 2GHz IMT-2000 services. 
- Appropriate policies will be devised for NP among 2G service providers (intra-
generation) and between 2G and 3G service providers (inter-generation) within 
a year after the adoption of NP within 3G. 
 
For 2GHz IMT-2000 services, NP will be introduced within 6 months after their service launch 
by more than 2 service providers in the market. 
 
5.2.4 The guaranty of stable and fair market conditions 
There is no restriction on the number of licenses to allocate in the fixed and mobile telephony 
market in Korea. However, very few companies enter the market nowadays, certainly 
because of the poor chances of survival due to heavy charges on operators, costs of new 
networks or advertising, etc. In addition, entering the Korean market is not easy given the 
burdensome entry conditions: Limited application periods, license fees, R&D taxes, etc. 
 
• Legal certainty and planning certainty 
As part of the very powerful Korean government, the Korean regulatory body is strong and 
provides high legal and planning certainty. The high degree of legal and planning certainty in 
Korea is a result of Korea's quasi-authoritarian government tradition and a complex socio-
historic tradition. Korea's history is marked by Confucianism15, wars, Japanese colonization 
                                                          
15 The interventionist role of the state may have been supported by Confucian values emphasizing obedience to 
authority: « It is implicitly accepted that whatever the Government does is for the benefit of the society. Under 
these social values, whatever the Government does is assumed to be in the public interest. Even today, many 
Koreans believe that it is in their interest for private citizens to have the Government’s blessing to do any kind 
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and several very interventionist authoritarian military governments. As a result of all these 
factors, the Korean political and social context is one of little opposition and debate. In the 
mere field of telecom regulation, this social habitus definitely influences the powers and 
outcomes of the regulator.  
 
As most governmental interventions, decisions of the MIC and the KCC are imposed and 
enforced with very little controversy or debate even if there is currently a tendency to change. 
Operators have started complaining about the lack of negotiations and transparency of the 
regulatory body, in spite of the current system's ability to provide legal and planning certainty. 
At variance with Korea's traditional lack of contesting, recently, several appeal procedures 
have been engaged against governmental (KFTC) decisions in the telecom sector. 
 
Operators claim that the type of legal certainty yielded by the present system is not desirable. 
In the light of recent evolutions, there is a discussion to part with Korea's tradition of 
centralized and unopposed authoritarian power, and give more independence to the KCC 
with the next adaptations of the law. The new configuration of the Korean regulatory regime 
would certainly be more transparent and open, but it would also cause problems in terms of 
legal and planning certainty, just like those that exist in most other industrialized countries.  
 
A lack in planning certainty is also due to the time limit needed by KCC to settle a dispute. 
Different parties in a conflict have to negotiate and try to find a solution within 90 days. After 
this deadline, they may ask KCC to solve the case. Then KCC has to settle the dispute within 
a maximum of 90 days. Thus, the total time needed to solve a conflict can reach a maximum 
of 6 months. Furthermore, another reason for procedural lengths is the patent lack of 
personnel at KCC. Unlike France where there is a solid culture of civil servants, in Korea civil 
servants are disregarded and therefore divested of means. 
 
In spite of this remark, we can deem that settlement decisions are quite rapidly given in 
Korea compared to other OECD countries where the time limit can be really excessive 
(sometimes up to 1 year). This can be explained by the fact that administrative decisions in 
Korea are scarcely appealed and overruled and that the administration does not have to take 
these possibilities into account. 
 
• Debt authorization 
This topic is quite sensitive in Korea, especially because of the Chaebols tradition16. Indeed, 
Chaebols were well known for their high level of debt, which results of their diversification into 
many business lines and their reliance on bank loan. They were so big (thousands of 
employees in multiple areas) that they were often considered as “too big to fail”. The Chaebol 
problem can be found in the whole Korean industry especially in terms of corruption and 
nepotism. Today, the situation is quite different since the major objective of the governments 
since the mid-80s has been to reduce the concentration of economic power in the Chaebols. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of business, whether there are specific regulations affecting them or not » KIM Jong-Seok, Korea’s regulatory 
reform : an overview, Hong Im University, Mimeo, 1999 
16  See point 1.3 
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However, the Chaebol heritage still accounts for the Korean tendency to allow companies 
(including telcos) to accumulate important debts. 
 
• Sanction power 
Sanctions can be taken in case of unfair practices: Refusal to negotiate and provide 
interconnection, breach of agreement, discriminatory treatment, etc. Till next April, the 
amount of fines can reach a maximum of 1 billion KRW (about 728’000 €) or 3% of yearly 
revenue (depending on cases), which is very low and does not burden much cheating 
operators. 
 
With the new law, the maximum amount of fines will be increased, which will certainly have 
more impact on the telcos’ behavior. 
 
Another way to punish operators is penalty days. For example, on October 26, 2002, the 
KCC decided to place penalties for the violation of the handset subsidy ban to SKT, KTF, LG 
and KT. Operators were prohibited to attract new subscribers for a certain period of time to 
lessen the consumer inconvenience. The service for existing subscribers was provided as it 
usually is. The penalty duration of each operator was as follows: 30 days for SKT, 20 days for 
KTF and LG and 10 days for KT PCS resale. 
 
• Prices surveillance 
At the end of 1995, the prior approval system for telecommunication tariffs was abolished. 
Under that system, the MIC had to approve all telecommunication tariffs from all operators. 
Now operators are free to determine their own tariffs, and changes in tariffs have to be 
notified to the MIC. However, the MIC has intervened in tariff setting and can refuse a change 
in prices. The only tariffs that now require formal approval are those of KT’s local service and 
those of SKT, the market leader in mobile service. The justification for maintaining the 
approval system on KT’s local charges (fixed and usage charges) and on SKT is market 
dominance.  
5.3 The guaranty of public service 
 
5.3.1 Universal service 
 
USO was defined in the TBA on September 17, 1998, and specific rules were laid down in 
the Implementation rule of TBA on March 17, 1999. KT was designated as the universal 
service provider for two years from December 3, 1999 and the Order on US deficit calculation 
was issued on December 31, 1999. Finally US as defined by the new law started on January 
1, 2000 and KT was selected again as a US provider for two years on March 7, 2002. 
 
The term universal service means the basic telecommunications service which any user may 
receive at reasonable fees anytime anywhere [TBA, Art 2 (3)]. US in Korea includes 4 areas: 
 
- Wireline telephone: Local telephone, local payphone, insular phone 
- Emergency calls 
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- Wireless telephone service for ships 
- Rate discount for low-income and disabled subscribers 
 
Currently the major issue about US is the opportunity or not to include broadband Internet 
service.  
 
The method to recover the deficit of US provider is the following: 
 
- For local telephone, local payphone, insular telephone and wireless telephone service for 
ships, common carriers contribute proportionally to their net revenues. 
- For emergency calls, rates discount for low-income and disabled subscribers, the deficit 
is recovered by each carrier. 
 
Currently, the calculation method used in Korea is the FDC (Fully Distributed Cost) method, 
but there will be a switch to LRIC in 2005. Up till now, there was a limited compensation rate 
for the refunding of USO costs that depended on the category of service and the 
cost/revenue ratio. Follwing this scheme, KT could recover between 10% and 90% of the 
costs induced by the provision of USO. In August 2002, the compensation rate was fixed at 
50%, whatever the service or cost/revenue ratio. As a result, the refunds received by KT for 
USO were significantly increased.  
 
The reasons behind these changes were KT’s privatization and the consequent assumption 
that KT’s market dominance and interconnection revenues would decrease. Accroding to KT 
however, USO is still a big field loss and compensation should increase in the long run with 
further competition from fixed and mobile operators. The compensation rate will be increased 
up to 100% by 2005 as the LRIC (long run incremental cost) scheme will be adopted. 
. 
5.3.2 Consumer protection and quality control 
In Korea, KT is obliged to provide compensation to customers (Art. 27 of KT’s terms of 
service contract) if phone service becomes unavailable and also provide compensation if 
malfunctions are not corrected within 12 hours after being reported. The requirement to 
compensate customers when faults are not repaired within a specified time period also 
applies to other service providers. 
 
In June 1999, MIC started a Telecommunications Performance Monitoring System (TPMS) 
aimed at auditing call quality and customer service. This has begun for mobile calls, local, 
international and long distance services. The TPMS uses both subjective and objective 
indicators. Customer service is evaluated by an independent agency based on data 
submitted by operators. Results of TPMS are published and eventually used to fine operators 
that do not meet service quality requirements. 
 
In addition, the KCC has a customer complaints center which investigates cases submitted 
by consumers. 
 
The number of complaints concerning telecommunications service standards in Korea has 
risen substantially over the past 4 years. According to the MIC, the increase is a result of 
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increasing competition in the telecommunications sector and a rise in the number of service 
providers. The majority of complaints concerned overcharging and poor service. 
 
6. Evaluation of the regulatory system 
6.1 Evaluation of the NRA 
 
6.1.1 Resources and expertise 
The MIC and the KCC are currently updating their tasks repartition; the tendency is to give 
more independence to the KCC to settle disputes, impose substantial fines, in fact to make 
sure that telecommunications laws are respected and implemented. The MIC will keep 
passing the telecommunications policies and laws and will still decide about entries, spectrum 
allocation, numbering plans, price regulation, etc. 
 
The KCC will probably become a more independent regulatory body with the current law 
modifications. However, the Korean culture of having a strong government and authoritarian 
public policies will be difficult to change rapidly. That means the establishment of a totally 
independent regulatory body is quite unlikely to imagine in Korea. 
 
It is interesting to point out that Korea follows the same trend of reform (improvement of 
dispute settlement prerogatives) than the rest of western countries. Thus, we can deem that 
Korean telecommunications conjuncture and regulation issues meet those of other countries. 
 
The KCC will have to increase its staff in order to comply with its new legal obligations. 
Litigation cases are increasing and the staff is overloaded with work. 
 
The expertise of the KCC is widely recognized. However, we can point out that the MIC has 
also a specific telecommunications expertise body named KISDI to which it often refers as 
well as the KCC. 
 
6.1.2 Independence vis-à-vis political interests and transparency 
On the one hand, the fact that KT is fully privatized since May 2002 signifies that it does no 
longer have linkages with the government as it could be the case in countries where the 
incumbent is partly state-owned. On the other hand, the Korean regulatory system is 
absolutely not independent from the government since the real regulatory body is the MIC 
and the KCC is only a half-independent body specialized for disputes resolution. 
 
We notice that there is a repetitive difficulty to apprehend the specific regulatory situation of 
Korea for Europeans, because it does not comply with any other western cases, but also for 
Korean citizens themselves. Indeed the articulation of relations between the MIC and the 
KCC is complex and confuse in terms of tasks repartition and is partly the cause of a certain 
opacity of the system. The Korean government should do everything to change this situation 
in order to reduce this complexity for Korean citizens and foreigners and therefore improve 
transparency. 
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Very few information in English can be found on the MIC and the KCC websites as well as in 
references. That is a pity for foreigners who want to inform themselves about 
telecommunications regulations in Korea, especially for investors. Those few reports found in 
English were mostly of them only about IT industry and IT market and not about regulations. 
Korea scarcely wants to question its regulatory system, which is always considered as 
perfect and as the best in the world although, according to some Korean interlocutors, very 
few negotiations are organized with telcos and decisions are mostly imposed. 
 
6.1.3 Efficacy and credibility 
The regulatory body is difficult to judge in Korea because of the particular institutional 
articulation. What we can state is, that the decisions of the MIC or the KCC have never been 
overruled till now and are scarcely appealed. 
 
In matter of efficacy, this may mean two things: either the regulatory bodies are extremely 
fair, or the possibilities of appeal are very narrow, which is rather the case. Furthermore we 
have to take into consideration the Confucian culture and its influence on the Korean society 
which causes a kind of allegiance of people to administrative decisions. 
 
The asymmetric regulation exerted by the MIC on KT is not strong enough, in particular in the 
fixed telephony, where the extreme dominance of KT can be described as excessive and 
tending towards monopoly. This market is becoming unattractive, which is on the total 
opposite of public policies objectives of regulation. 
 
6.2 Flexibility of the whole regulatory system 
 
The Korean regulatory system is currently changing and will certainly result in an extension of 
prerogatives of the KCC in April 2003. The reason for this and the will to change is certainly a 
desire to converge to other well-known western regulatory system like the FCC or the OFTEL 
and to adapt the system to today’s economic context, which requires a clear and logical 
repartition of competencies (unlike the double mission of the MIC). 
 
An illustration of the adaptability of the system could be the example mentioned by the MIC: 
In 1997, the dramatic Asian economic crisis did not have major repercussion on the 
telecommunications sector which continued to grow unlike other fields. The MIC protagonists 
deem that this paradoxical situation was a logical consequence of the adaptation of 
telecommunications laws to the market context and that it was proving the flexibility and the 
efficiency of the Korean telecommunications regulatory system. 
 
In order to make regular assessments of the situation of the Korean telecommunications 
sector, the MIC and KISDI carry out studies on a regular basis. These studies are usually 
market studies and IT studies, but they rarely assess performance of regulatory intervention. 
Some evaluation of regulation is realized by the OECD or the APEC, but they do not have a 
monitoring purpose since they are external. 
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7. Performance indicators 
7.1 Competition 
 
• Number of operators in the market 
The total number of operators in the local, long distance, international, mobile, leased lines, 
broadband wireless Internet markets, etc. was 43 in 2002, which is very low compared to 
other OECD countries. Currently telcos are threatened by the global economic slowdown and 
their future is not ensured17. In brief, we can describe the indicator “number of operators” as 
bad in Korea and even worsening. 
 
The Korean authorities have a huge responsibility in this situation, indeed, they did not allege 
the burdens on operators last years: Licensees taxes, obligatory R&D participation, only two 
application periods in a year, etc. In addition Korea is the only OECD country to impose limits 
on foreign ownership, which obliges Korean telcos to find preferably native investors. 
 
Regarding regulatory bodies (MIC and KCC), their responsibility in this field is limited, since 
they cannot control the economic context or the demand-side, but nevertheless they could 
exert some pressures in order to facilitate licensing procedures. Otherwise, the MIC did a lot 
in order to maintain or increase the number of competitors on the market: It controls fixed 
market incumbent’s local and mobile market prices, it promoted the introduction of CPS, LLU 
and NP and finally, even if this fact is more related to socio-cultural factors, it ensures legal 
and planning certainty. 
 
• Market shares of the incumbent 
KT’s market shares are extremely dominating in the fixed telephony, especially in the local 
telephony market with 96% and in the long-distance telephony market with 85%. As for 
international telephony, KT’s market shares can be described as reasonable (63%). 
 
SKT, the incumbent on the mobile market has a market share of 52.8% as of November 
2002, which indicates a good level of competition in this segment. Nevertheless, competitors 
of SKT are complaining about its dominance and demand a strong asymmetrical regulation 
comparable to that of the fixed telephony market (control of cost-accounting, termination 
prices, marketing strategies). Although, the dominance of SKT is comparable to the one of 
incumbents in other OECD countries and although Korea already exerts a form of 
asymmetric regulation on the mobile market as the regulator controls SKT’s prices, demand 
for asymmetric regulation increases. 
 
The Internet field is very competitive especially regarding ADSL (65% of broadband market) 
where KT is confronted with strong marketing dynamism from Hanaro. Other sectors such as 
cable, Wireless Internet, etc. have different characteristics. On the one hand, the cable 
market is quite competitive as well with 4 competitors: Hanaro, Dreamline, DACOM, Onse 
Telecom. On the other hand, the wireless Internet market is monopolized by DACOM. 
 
                                                          
17  In this regard KT is about to release about 2000 employees in 2003 
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The government has introduced measures such as LLU to prevent unfair practices resulting 
from the existing monopoly of subscriber lines and to provide all service providers with equal 
access to the lines. However, it does not offer a fundamental solution. Hanaro complained 
recently about KT’s local loop fees and facilities, and KT received a 300 million KRW penalty 
(about 218’000 €).  
 
It is difficult to state that competition in the Korean domestic telecommunications market is 
either fair or very effective. Fair competition requires the prevention of unfair business 
practices so that the natural benefits of competition (for instance price reductions and service 
diversification) are reflected in the market. 
 
Reducing ex-ante regulatory measures and strengthening ex-post regulation has been the 
recent strategy in the Korean telecommunications market. However, as the Korean 
telecommunications industry seems to lean towards further consolidation and 
monopolization, there is still need for strong asymmetric regulation. 
 
In theory, there is free competition in the domestic telecommunications market; but in reality, 
most service providers are too weak to compete against market leaders. In fact, the 
dominance of KT in the fixed telecommunications sector and that of SKT in the wireless 
sector still continues. Telcos that were established as part of the policy to promote 
competition on the market are having difficulties in achieving profits, due to the market 
dominance of the leading service provider, the limited market size, and the large initial 
investment burden. 
 
Eventually we can describe the indicator “market shares” as reasonably bad in Korea since 
KT still dominates more or less the whole fixed market and since SKT slightly dominates the 
mobile market. Concerning the broadband Internet market (dial-up almost does not exist 
anymore), it is quite competitive with Hanaro’s dynamism but KT also dominates. 
 
Regulatory bodies could obviously do a better job in this field: Price information to the public, 
surveillance of the incumbent’s compliance with the provision of pre-products (prices, 
timeframes, quality, time of response) are neglected, surveillance of abusive marketing 
practices could be as substantial as surveillance of advertising. Finally, maximal fines allowed 
by law should be inflicted to incumbents in order to have more impact on them. 
 
Of course regulatory bodies can hardly deal with external factors like customers’ loyalty to the 
incumbent, bad quality of new entrants’ services or the lack of choice in certain parts of the 
country because of the absence of competitors. 
 
• Choice for the consumers 
Several different technologies are offered to Korean customers: In the fixed telephony market 
3 technologies are proposed: Fixed telephony (copper wire), cable telephony and wireless 
local loop. Sedentary technologies however are losing speed to the profit of mobile 
telephony. Korean mobile telephony offers only one technology: CDMA technology, a 
formally foreign technology which was natively developed. As for Internet, 5 technologies are 
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proposed: ADSL, cable Internet, wireless Internet, LAN and satellite. Dial-up and ISDN 
Internet are in a phase of decline. 
 
Korean customers responded very rapidly to the ADSL offer, making their country the world 
leader in this technology. 
 
Regarding the choice of operators it can be described as quite low: In fixed telephony, there 
are 2 operators on the local market, and 3 on the long-distance and international markets.For 
mobile telephony, there are also 3 operators.  
 
Globally, in matters of choice between different operators, Korea does not have a very good 
record. Operators are very limited on the telecommunications market compared to other 
OECD countries which could be the result of a lack of attractiveness, of heavy burdens on 
operators and of Korean protectionism towards foreign capital. The main target of the MIC 
should be specifically to allege burdens on new operators and to loosen its policies regarding 
foreign capital. On the other hand, choice between technologies is very dynamic since new 
technologies are always put forward as national targets and rapidly replace old ones. This is 
the case for ADSL and cable Internet. Concerning CDMA technology, all efforts are made to 
carry on with it in 3G, in order to always be innovating and to distinguish itself from other 
countries. 
 
Main external factors to this indicator are topography and the absence of operators in some 
areas of the country. In Korea the topography is rather mountainous but 80% of the 
population lives in cities, which is positive for a rapid extension of new technologies and their 
reach of numerous people. Forgotten areas are scarce in Korea, maybe on some islands or 
in far-off villages. Operators did not hesitate to invest in low populated areas for 2 main 
reasons: The installation of their network in order to reach the rest of the population (in cities 
and agglomerations) did not cost as much as in other countries since many people are in the 
same areas. Second, the purpose was to gain a good image in low populated areas 
(recognition as “universal operators”). 
 
• End-users prices 
 
Figure 6 Fixed voice Telephony, 3 minute local call, average charge in €, source ITU 
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Figure 7 Mobile telephony, 3 minute local call, average charge in €, Source ITU 
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Figure 8: Average price for 20 hours Internet access, in €, source OECD 
 
 
Figure 9: Average price for 40 hours Internet access peak times, in €, source OECD  
 
• Regarding fixed telephony, we can observe that the price of a 3 minute local call 
remained stable between 1998 and 2001 (average 0.13 €) and above all very low 
compared to our other 7 countries (figure 14). As for long-distance calls, end-user 
prices are considered too low (indeed, they decreased by about 60% since 
liberalization) and companies active on this market segment claim they don’t earn 
enough money. The long-distance fixed telephony market is a particularly unattractive 
market, very few companies want to enter it. 
 
• As for mobile telephony, the same remark can be formulated (prices decreased only 
from 0.31 € to 0.27 € between 1998 and 2001 (figure 15)). In 2001, Austria was the 
only country to have cheaper prices than Korea in this segment. Globally, tariffs for 
mobile telephony decrease by 7% every year. 
 
• Regarding Internet prices, some data are missing for Korea concerning the price for 20 
hours Internet access (figure 16). We only know that it was of average 34.48 € between 
1995 and 2000, which was the lowest price in our 8 countries at that time. Regarding 
the price for 40 hours Internet access, Korean prices decreased from 41.5 € to 27.5 € 
between 2000 and 2001 and are the second cheapest prices after the USA (figure 17). 
 
Eventually we can describe the indicator “end-user prices” as good, since end-user prices are 
very low in Korea in comparison with other countries. The only critic we can mention 
concerns wholesale leased lines prices which are very expensive compared to other OECD 
countries (195 in 2002, OECD average being 100)18 in contradiction with the notion which 
state that high leased lines hinder ADSL development.  
                                                          
18 OECD Price index for basket of national leased lines of 2Mbits, 2002 
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The MIC should monitor wholesale prices better, especially leased lines prices. Otherwise 
and generally, the price monitoring policy is good, notably with the active surveillance of KT’s 
local prices and SKT’s mobile prices and did certainly impulse the drop of prices. 
 
The MIC and the KCC cannot control some external factors such as price-wars between 
operators, cartel agreements between operators and the responsiveness of consumers to 
prices. 
 
7.2 Public service 
 
Availability of services throughout the country 
In this regard, South Korea can be described as far in advance compared to other OECD 
countries: 
 
• Population Broadband coverage (ADSL, Cable Internet, etc.) almost reaches 100% and 
households’ broadband penetration already passed 60%, which is close to saturation 
point. 
• VDSL is expected to reach 85% of Korean households by 2005 
• Territory and population Mobile telephony coverage is 100% 
 
These results are mainly caused by governmental policies which aim to promote Korea as a 
top leader in new technologies. Secondly telcos are urged to invest a part of their turnover in 
R&D (2%), which is positive for native development and improvement of new technologies 
but rather negative for telcos for which it is a big burden. 
 
Regulatory bodies do not have a strong impact on this situation apart for the provision of legal 
certainty for telcos, for instance the necessity for them to invest in new networks. It must not 
be forgotten that legal certainty is mainly provided by the Confucian cultural factor which 
states that everything coming from the administration is good for the people, which means 
little opposition to state’s decisions. 
 
• Quality of services 
No special quality problems are reported in Korea apart in mobile telephony (network 
disorders) as anywhere else. Therefore the indicator “quality of services” can be deemed as 
good. 
 
The Telecommunications Performance Monitoring System (TPMS) carried out in 1999 by the 
MIC is a good example of what can be made by regulatory bodies in this area. Its aim is to 
audit call quality and customer service of mobile, local, international and long distance 
services. Results of these inquiries are yearly published and used to fine operators who do 
not meet service quality requirements. 
 
From our point of view, Korean regulatory policies in this area are positive for consumers 
though some improvement could be introduced in matter of objective measurement tools for 
consumers and of evaluation of directory inquiries or value-added services. In addition we 
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consider that these prerogatives concerning quality monitoring should be transferred entirely 
to KCC which currently only has a customers’ complaints center. 
 
• Information to the public 
This question is quite difficult to handle for us because most of the present information on 
regulatory websites (MIC and KCC) is in Korean language, which we do not master. We only 
had access to some English information which is clearly unsatisfactory and incomplete 
compared to other OECD non anglophone countries. On the one hand, we estimate that it is 
excusable since it is natural that most information can be found in native language and less in 
a foreign language. On the other hand, some efforts should be made above all for possible 
foreign investors, since the English language is the only current lingua franca and since the 
Korean language is unfortunately very scarcely taught in western schools. 
 
Regarding information in English language, we can describe the indicator “information to the 
public” as reasonably bad. Regarding information in Korean language, we heard that no price 
indications are proposed by the MIC or the KCC on their websites. The emphasis is above all 
placed on quality services and regulatory and telecommunications news. Information about 
technologies does not seem to be primordial since most of Korean citizens are already well 
up to date about those subjects.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
South Korea is often described as an economic wonder and this is also partly true for 
telecommunications: It is an Asian country, which achieved its economic development in a 
thirty year time period, which endured an amazing economic crisis in 1997-1998 and 
recovered after it. Other Korean particularities in relation with the telecommunications field 
are as followed: 
 
Major positive aspects: 
− High education level which allows new technologies to spread rapidly. 
− Internet skills as a priority in schools. 
− Excellent governmental R&D and IT policy. 
− Fully privatized incumbent: A unique case in our 8 case studies with Denmark 
− Broadband world’s champion, mainly as a result of an excellent DSL network promotion 
by the government and of KT’s important enhancement policy. Korea always wants to be 
in advance (ADSL, VDSL, wireless Internet, etc.) 
Major challenges 
− Rigidity and authoritarianism of the administration linked with Confucian heritage. 
− Opacity of legislation. 
− Nationalism: Domestic companies are always put forward. However there has been 
some improvement in foreign stakes limit. 
− Fixed market highly dominated by KT Corp. 
− Complexity of regulatory regime which consists of 2 bodies: The MIC and the KCC. 
The KCC is an integral part of the MIC and can be described as “half-independent”. 
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− Patent lack of administrative means (in terms of personnel and sanction power). 
Current revisions of the TBA (applicable in April 2003) will improve the situation. 
 
Globally speaking, Korean regulatory bodies have a rather mixed record. On the one hand, 
the regulatory system needs to be significantly revised (which seems currently underway), 
the number of operators is unsatisfactory and the incumbent is still extremely dominating. On 
the other hand, the leadership of Korea in IT fields tends to demonstrate the efficiency of 
government policies and results in a lesser degree of regulatory policies. Furthermore, a 
good service monitoring system contributes to give a positive image to regulatory bodies. 
 
 
In addition to that, we have to insist on a point when we handle the Korean case: Decisions 
are mostly imposed without any negotiations or consultations (authoritarianism). The tradition 
of discussion does not belong to the Korean Confucian tradition; this fact can be seen as very 
negative for western people born in an opposite tradition; on the other hand, the legal and 
planning certainty, the possibility to impose decisions and national policies generated by this 
context is certainly the main cause of Korea’s world IT leadership. 
 
Currently 2 areas seem interesting to point out to light up the Korean regulatory future: 
 
• Empowerment of the KCC: it is important for the KCC to obtain some of the MIC’s 
regulatory competencies in order to become more autonomous. The target would be 
the transformation of the KCC into a real independent organization, which is difficult to 
foresee for now. Operators should have the possibility in the future to communicate 
with only one interlocutor responsible for most telecommunications regulatory issues. In 
our point of view Korea is telecommunications regulatory system is at a turning point. 
 
• National policies in favor of technology: VDSL is already in installation in Korea and will 
replace ADSL more or less rapidly. Here again, Korea will be at the forefront of 
technological development. 3G CDMA2000 is going to be implemented in the next 
years and will be a world premiere. 
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